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STATEMENT D£ IHE. ISSUES

THE QUESTION OF TAX COURT JURISDICTION
CI) Does UCA 59-24-1, which cereates the Tax Court
Division of the District Courts, grant general
Jurisdiction, or only "exclusive Jurisdiction of
all appeals from and petitions for review of
decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered
after formal hearings before the Commission", to
the Tax Court?
CB) When a District Court Judge sits as the
District's "Tax Court Judge", is he limited to the
jurisdictional scope of the "Tax Court" ?
C3) Can the Tax Court, created by UCA 59-E4-1,
assume jurisdiction over a case before the State
Tax Commission has conducted "formal hearings",
and "rendered" any decisions pursuant to the
evidence presented at said "formal hearings"?
IHE, QUESTION QF SUMMONS AND SERUICE OF PROCESS
CI) Is a "Petition for Ulrit of Mandate" a civil
action which requires adherence to the rules of
civil proceedure, particularly rule 4 concerning
process?
CE3 Uithout proper service of process, how does
the Tax Court gain Jurisdiction over Appellant?
C33 If rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Proceedure does not apply, how can Appellant
object to the sufficiency of service of process?
C4) Is the service of a "notice of hearing"
sufficient as to replace the requirements for a
service of summons ?

EfllMI ILL

lift QUESTION

OF JEOPARDY PURSUANT TO

59-31 UCA
C D Is Chapter 31 of Title 59 UCA descriptive of
"Jeopardy assessment procedure" or of some other
procedure?
C2) Is the "Writ of Mandate" proceeding, pursuant
to UCA 59-31-7, an unusual kind of special
proceeding in the form of "injunctive relief"? If
so, then is "Jeopardy" the special circumstances
under which such an unusual proceeding is
warranted?
C3) Can the "Writ of Mandate", pursuant to 59-31-7
UCA, be used where jeopardy neither exists nor is
alledged?

THE QUESTION OF

SUFFICIENCY OF EUIDENCE

CI) Did the Respondent present sufficient evidence
to support the allegations proffered in the
"Uerified Petition For Writ of Mandate"?
C23 Can evidence be "assumed", "presumed",
"nonfactual", "hearsay", "probative", "not the
origional", or based upon a "bogus report", or
based upon a "notion" of the State Tax Commission,
and be acceptable as proof of some allegation?
C3) Is the appearance of the Appellant, that is
his clothes and state of health, proof of his
being a "taxpayer" and his having received
"income"?
C43 If Appellant is not a "taxpayer" or the
receipt of "income", does he have a "legal duty"to
file a tax return and can he be "mandated" to do
so?

Ill

STATUTORY PR0UIS10N5

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED:

Title 59, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act
Section 1, Subsection 1:
CDThere is created a tax division m each of the
district courts of the State of Utah which shall hove
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions
for review of decisions by the state tax commission
rendered after formal hearings before the commission.
Title 5S, Chapter 31: Jeopardy
Section 7, Subsection 1:
CI) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required
pursuant to Title 59 within SO days of the time
prescribed, the state tax commision may petition for a
writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the
return. The petition may be filed, in the discretion of
the tax commission, in the tax court of the third
judicial district or in the district court for the
county in which the taxpayer resides or has his
principal place of business. In the case of a
nonresident taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the
third district court.
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for
a writ of mandate within 20 days after the filing of the
petition or as soon thereafter as the court may
determine, having regard for the rights of the parties
and the necessity of a speedy determination of the
petition.
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within
60 days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the
tavpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall
include an award of attorneys' fees, court costs,
witness fees and all other costs in favor of the
prevailing party.

UTAH RULES 0£ CIUIL PROCEDURE

RULE 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

(A) Scope of rules:
These rules shall govern the procedure in the
Supreme Court, the district courts,city courts, and
Justice courts in the State of Utah, in all
actions,suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all statutory
proceedings, except as stated in Rule Bl. They shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.

RULE 4. PROCESS

Ca) Issuance of Summons.
The summons may be signed and issued by the
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to
have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified
person for the purpose of sevice. Separate summonses
may be issued and served.
Cb) Time of Issuance and Service.
If an action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint, summons must issue thereon within three
mantfaa ££Sffl the. date of. such filing. The summons must
be served within one year after the filing of the
complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed,
provided that in any action brought against two or more
defendants in which personal service has been obtained
upon one of them within the year, the other or others
may be served or appear any time before trial.

Cc) Contents of Summons.
The summons shall contain the name of the court,
the names or designations of the parties to the action,
the county in which it is brought, be directed to the
defendant, state the time within which the defendant is
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall
notify him that in case of his failure to do so,
judgment by default will be rendered against him. If
the summons be served without a copy of the complaint,
or by publication, it shall briefly state the sum of
money or other relief demanded, and in case of
publication of summons such summons as published shall
contain a description of the subject matter or res
involved in the action, Uihere the summons is served
without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy
of said complaint will be served upon or mailed to
defendant within ten days after such service or that if
the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will
be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days
after such service.
Rule B4A. PREJUDGEMENT WRITS
C5) At the hearing on the issue of the writ or its
continuance, the proponent of the writ shall have the
burden of establishing the facts Justifying its issuance
and continuance.

list ARGUMENTS

POINT #1

I M COURT JURISDICTION

Mr. Miller, Assistant Attorney General and counsel for
the State Tax Commission, claims difficulty in following my
arguments (Respondent' s Brief, P 12). I appologise if I have
been unclear, because I want very much to be understood for
my issues and arguments are valid. I rather suspect that fir.
fliller understands better than he would have one believe, but
using confusion as an excuse, he rewrite^the arguments into
something he can successfully argue against, and proceeds to
attack those rewritten issues. A prime example of this is
found in the order issued by the Tax Court during the hearing
on August 9, 1985 as quoted in the Respondent's brief on page
6. This order was prepared by fir. fliller and presented to the
Judge before the hearing. I was never given opportunity to
review it for accurateness before it was signed by the judge.
It flagrantly misstates my arguments in both points 1 & 2
becausfc I have never challenged the constitutionality of the
statutes, but rather the application of those statutes by the
State Tax Commission (hereinafter referred to as the STC3.

In order that there may be no more misunderstanding the
issues, let me state clearly: I do not challenge the
authority of the District Court to inforce writs of mandate,
for they clearly have power to so do!

I concur completely

with this court in its ruling in the Loaney case, concerning
district court Jurisdiction, as cited in the Respondent's
Brief at 15. Furthermore, I do not challenge the authority of
the Tax Court to issue writs of mandate in situations where
it has Jurisdiction, as specifically granted by the
legislative act which created it C59-S4-1 UCA3 . Lastly, I do
not "simply ignore" the language used in section 59-31-7, but
have read and analyzed those paragraphs extensively and
contend that the intent of the legislature is best understood
through the words of the act.

I have confidence that our

legislators are very proficient in the construction and use
of the English language, and that when they use the word
"exclusive", they intend it to convey the meaning as commonly
accepted.

Such common acceptance is properly verified by

consulting a well established dictionary such as Webster's
New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Appellant's Brief, P 113.
Mr. Miller cites no such authority in reaching the apparent
definition he is attempting to apply, but simply says that
the meaning is "obvious" *C Respondent's Brief at 143. What is
apparently so "obvious" to fir. Miller escaped the meticulous
Mr. Webster and his staff.
UCA 59-31-7 is basicly a straight forward simple
statute. If one allows the words and phrases to carry their

commonly accepted meaning, it is easy to see that this
statute is principally directed to the STC, and is to be
applied only to "taxpayers".

Said section mentions three

different courts in which a petition for writ of mandate may
be filed: the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District, the
District Court for the county in which the taxpayer resides,
and the Third District Court.

The commission is directed to

use its "discretion" in applying the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine the proper court in which to file
said petition.

It is my contention that the commission

errored on at least three counts when applying this section
in instant case. First, that they are attempting to apply it
against one who is not a "taxpayer" (this error will be
addressed under point #4, Evidence). Secondly, they are
attempting to apply an extraordinary, special procedure
legislatively designed for jeopardy situations, without
jeopardy being alledged nor proven (this error will be
addressed in point #3, Jeopardy).

Thirdly, they errored in

selecting the proper court in which to file their petition
for writ of mandate.
Uhen a District Court Judge sits in the legislatively
created Tax Court,he is limited by the "Tax Court Act" CS9-24
UCA) to the position of an appellate court judge, not the
Judge of a court of origional Jurisdiction like the District
Court.

The Tax Court of any Judicial district is not the

District Court of that Judicial district, nor is the District
Court the Tax Court, but they are two distinct and seperate

courts, each with its own powers, grants, and scope of
jurisdiction.
Perhaps a couple of pertinente questions and their
answers will aid in seeing this distinction.

First, if the

Tax Court of the Third Judicial District is simply a district
court Judge to whom all tax related issues are assigned, why
did it take a legislative act to create it?

A simple

categorizing of cases could have been accomplished by the
district court itself through its own case assignment
process. The answer to this question is clearly that the
Legislature had more in mind than Just a categorizing of
cases. Secondly, before the passage of The Tax Court Act
(59-24 UCA) in 1977, what court had appelate jurisdiction
over "...appeals from and petitions for review of decisions
by the state tax commission..."? Was it the District Courts?
No it was not! Before the passage of said Tax Court Act this,
the Supreme Court of the state, had such Jurisdiction. This
is indicated by the fact that the State Tax Commission Code
of Administrative Procedure in sections 1-1C13D and 8-1 still
refer to this, the Supreme Court, as the proper court of
appeal from Commission decisions CR-85,R-94).

Obviously the

legislature created the Tax Courts of the various Judicial
districts for the purpose of relieving this the Utah Supreme
Court of some of its case burden by creating an interum forum
for resolving some of the issues. The District Courts have
never had appelate jurisdiction of appeals from State Tax
Commission decisions, nor do they now have such Jurisdiction.

Likewise, the Tax Court has never had, nor does it now have
general, origional Jurisdiction over all tax issues, but has
"...exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions
for review of decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered
after formal hearings before the commission.".

Here is the

point of my arguement: since the Tax Court is "exclusively"
an appelate court, it is barred, by the statute creating it,
from hearing instant case which comes as an origional action
cammensed by the State Tax Commission, not an appeal from any
of their decisions!

POINT #E

SUMMONS AND SERUICE D£ PROCESS

The basic arguments of insufficient service of process
were well briefed in the Appellant's Brief and need no
explanation here. However I will make two observations
concerning the STC arguments on this point before moving on:
First, Mr.Miller states that this is a "...legislatively
authorized special action that is not therefore subsumed
within the ordinary or usual civil actions described in Rule
3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Respondent's Brief
P. 16). It is a fact that this is a legislatively authorized

special action, but fir. Miller failed to notice that Rule 1
RCP states that "These rules shall govern the procedure in...
al} statutory proceedings,.."Cemphasis added). The only
logical situation where a short-cut could be justified is in
emergency situations where time is critical and action must
be taken to prevent an irreconcilable loss from occurring. A
condition of Jeopardy would be that type of situation and
that is why the writ of mandate is found in the jeopardy
section of the code. But of course, that is the subject of
Point #3.
Second we come to the absurd conclusion by the STC that
since this court didn't raise the summons issue, sua sponte,
in the Looney case, it is an unavailing argument in this case
(Respondent's Brief P. 17). Such reasoning fails to hold
water because if Mr. Looney didn't raise the issue in the
District Court or on appeal, this court is under no
obligation to rule on it of its own initiative. I suspect
that Mr. Miller brings this point out, not so much for the
merits of the point itself, but more in an attempt to
convince the court, through many references, that this case
is identical to the Looney case. The facts of the matter are
that this case is substantially different from the Looney
*

case as will be pointed out in Point #4, and deserves to be
examined on its own merit and not tainted by cases that are
similar in subject matter, but very different in facts and
circumstances.

This is a prime example of fir. fliller's cunning
application of the sophistic art of his profession. He tries
to lead this court from assumed facts and rephrased
arguments, under color of law, to mistaken conclusions.

POINT #3

UCft 59-31-7. JEOPARDY

Mr. Miller argues that the "...validity of section
59-31-7 does not depend upon any particular location in the
Utah Code."(Respondent's Brief P IB). I agree, but at the
same time I contend that the location has a great deal to do
with how a validly authorized statute is to be applied. The
issue at hand is proper application, not the validity or
constitutionality of the statute. Continuing on, Mr. fliller
contends that "...the title of Title 59 chapter 30 is not
law. It is merely a general identification of the provisions
which follow."CRespondent's Brief P IB). Again I agree,and
further add that the same applies to Title 59 Chapter 31,
*

which is the section being examined here. Said Title and
Chapter generally identifies all of the provisions which
follow as having to do with termination and jeopardy
assessment procedure of revenue and taxation.

tlr Miller also seems to infer that the location of any
particular statute within the code has no bearing on its
scope and application. With this argument, I must
emphatically disagree. If it were so, financial institutions
may be liable for the provisions under

Title 4 Utah

Agricultural Code, or perhaps hotel keepers would be bound by
Title 40 Mines and Mining. Such a situation is Just not
reasonable and needs no further argument.
Before leaving this point I must air two questions:
First, while it is agreed that formalistic rules of grammar
should not be controlling, how is one to know what the
"intent of the legislature" is on any statute except by the
words and location within the code of said statute? Second,
if this writ of mandate proceeding is indeed a "special
procedure" which allows extraordinary legal measures, then
what are the extraordinary circumstances which warrant such
measures?
I contend that the legislature knew precisely what it
was doing, and that they deliberately placed the writ of
mandate under chapter 31 UCA, intending it to be used only
under situations of jeopardy. Furthermore, I contend that
jeopardy is a special circumstance which would merit the use
of an extraordinary writ, but where no such special
circumstance exists, and no irreconcilable damage will result
unless immediate action is taken, the extraordinary writ of
mandate is improper,and unjustifiable!

POINT m

SUFFICIENCY D£ EUIDENCE

Of the four points argued in this Reply Brief, this
issue is the most important! It is not limited to the
question of whether the court had sufficient evidence before
it to enter a writ of mandate, but is the broader issue of
sufficiency of evidence for verifying a petition or proving
Jurisdiction. Mr. Miller claims that it is not a
jurisdictional argument, when in fact it goes to the very
root of jurisdiction. If this person received no "income",
then he cannot be be construed to be a "taxpayer". If he is
not a "taxpayer", then 59-31-7 UCA, uihich is specifically
directed to taxpayers only, cannot be applied to him and no
court can gain jurisdiction over him through said statute.
Mr.Miller, in his zealous attempt to prosecute me has
taken some of my statements, stretched them to the extreme
and claimed that distorted version to be "overwhelmingly
conclusive evidence" of "income" (Respondent's Brief P. 113.
He erroneously concludes that since I state that I "work", I
must of necessity be the recipient of "income". Such

reasoning is ridiculous! Take for example, my recent
situation of incarceration in the Salt Lake County Jail. I
"worked" even in there; I swept and mopped floors, washed the
tables, sinks, toilets,and showers, but I very seriously
doubt that "income" will ever result from said work. It is
also interesting to note that I survived quite well in there
despite having received no "income"! As I have stated before,
I do not work for, nor seek after, gain or profit (income).
Nevertheless, I do work almost every day, in fact I am
working right now as I am preparing this brief, but again no
income will result from this work.
fir. Miller further states: "...when Mr. Iverson
categorically denied receipt of substance for services, he
contradicted several statements in his "Uerified Statement of
Refutation"" (Respondent's Brief P. 233. This statement is a
brazen misrepresentation of the facts. Nowhere in said
"Uerified Statement of Refutation" do I state that I perform
"services", nor that I receive substance for services I Let me
emphatically state here that I do not perform services For
substance, because services can only be performed by a
servant for his master and I am not a servant to material
substance. As I have previously stated I am a free and
natural individual and have but one Master, my Creator!
The STC has alledged that during the years 1979 through
1982, I received income above a specified level which would
require a duty to file a return but in all of the hearings on

this case, there have been no definite figures accepted into
the record as income. If by some stretch of the imagination
my statements that I "work" and that I "deal on a cash
basis", could be construed to be evidence of income, there is
no indication of when and how much. To prove their
allegations, the STC must be able to show that income above
the statutory minimum

was received during each of the years

in question. Absent such proof, the issuance of a writ of
mandate is improper.
The STC argues that the Fifth Amendment Privilege
against self-incrimination does not protect a taxpayer from
disclosing the amount of his income (Respondent's Brief P,
19). While this may be a valid point in some cases Csuch as
the Jensen case as cited in the Respondent's brief addendum
II), it is off point in the case at hand since I am not a
"taxpayer" and have received no "income". I do not rely upon
a "Fifth Amendment Privilege" granted by the State, but
rather instead upon an inalienable right to privacy granted
by my Creator and guaranteed by both the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
With respect to the argument that "Mr. Iverson's evasive
and devious conduct... can be and was construed as an
admission to the allegations of the petition."(Respondent's
Brief P. El), I simply reply that such reasoning is clearly
faulty and indicates that the STC is grabbing at straws in a
desperate attempt to Justify the issuance of a writ of

mandate. It is my position that I as an individual have an
inalienable right to privacy. The Supreme Court of the United
States has ruled that the individual owes no duty to the
state to divulge his business or open his doors to
investigation C Appellant's Brief P. 22, Hale vs Henkel, 201
US 43 at p, 74). In the United States vs

Johnson case the

United States Supreme Court further ruled that: "the right
against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive
resistant, nor the person who is ignorant of hiss rights, not
to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting clause. Its
benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot
be claimed by an attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when
insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in person" (United
States vs Johnson, 76 F Supp 538 3 In the case at hand I am
that "belligerent claimant in person" and I have and will
continue to demand all of my rights, including my right to
privacy, at all times! What fir. Miller Judges to be evasive
and devious conduct is merely my efforts at insisting upon
retaining my right to privacy.
Perhaps the following examples will demonstrate the
ridiculous nature of such conclusions: Uhen I go to the rest
room to take care of natural body elimination, I like to
close the door. I like my privacy in that situation, not
because I am significantly different from any other male
member of the human race and want to hide that difference, or
because I am planning on doing anything that I am ashamed of.
People outside that locked door may speculate that all kinds

of wicked, awful, and terrible things are going on inside.
They may be right and they may be wrong, but the mere fact
that I insist on a closed and locked door while in the rest
room is not proof of any such activity going on inside.
Furthermore I will continue to insist that no one has the
right to force me to open that door so that they may see what
I do and criticise, analyze or discuss my activity. Similar
situations arise when one encloses his yard with a high solid
fence or constructs very private restriced places of worship,
such as temples. Those outside immediately begin to speculate
on what evil is being hidden, when most generally the only
purpose for such enclosures and restrictions is for pure and
simple privacy. I do not and will not willingly relinquish my
right to privacy for it has been given to me by my creator.
Without it, and my other God given rights, 1 cannot do what
He expects of me!
As is evident by the many references in the Respondent's
Brief to the Looney and the Jensen case, Mr. rtiller considers
them to be essentially identical to the case at hand, and
relies heavily upon them. What he fails to notice, or perhaps
intentionally ignores, is the fact that in both cases there
was evidence and admissions of receipts of specific amounts
over specific time periods. In fact Mr. Looney had wages from
which income taxes had been withheld and for which there were
W~2 forms on file (Respondent's Brief, Addendum I, P. 3 ) . In
Fir. Jensen's case there were exact amounts of earnings
established for the years in question which showed amounts,

each year, well above the statutory minimums for filing
(Respondent's Brief, Addendum II, P. 23. In the case at bar,
there is no such evidence, and that is why the STC is so
upset with my insistance to retain my right to privacy. They
would have me provide for them the evidence to prove their
allegations. When I deny their allegations and choose to
stand upon my right to privacy, as the belligerent claimant
in person, they assume that I am trying to hide guilt and
accuse me of obstruction of Justice saying that: "Mr.
Iverson's wrongful conduct frustrated the orderly
presentation of "evidence" in this case". They refuse to
acknowledge that such evidence does not exist even though I
have stated under oath that I received no income during the
years in question. If they do not believe that statement,
then how are they going to believe any of my statements. What
then is gained by my being a witness?
The purpose of my being called as a witness becomes
obvious from the retrospective viewpoint, Since I had already
given my testimony concerning the STC allegtions by denying
essentially all of them, and since the STC had no evidence of
their own to support them, fir. riiller sought to put me on the
witness stand so that he, through crafty questioning, could
expose some "discrepancy" showing that I am a bad person and
therefore guilty. Such fallacious reasoning is a perfect
example of the age old sophistic method of arguing called
"ad-hominem" in which the real issues are forsaken and a full
scale attack upon the character of the opponent is launched.

i\opj.y wrier - Page 15

Mr, Miller is hoping that if my character can be sufficiently
shattered, the issues will no longer be valid. Such is not
the case, because the issues are valid regardless of the
nature of my character. It is my prayer that this court will
look past all the mud slung at my character and Judge
according to the facts and the law.

CONCLUSION
All of my issues are valid and deserve careful
deliberation, each on its own merits. This court has not
ruled on them previously and ought to take this opportunity
to review the activities of the STC as compared to the
directives given them by the Legislature. The strong-arm
tactics currently used have little regard for the safeguards
written into the statutes to protect the individual from
governmental harrassment. This court should not permit a
state agency to so abuse the power granted to it.
The order of the Third District Tax Court should be
summarily reversed.
DATED this

day of June, 1986.

Clay K. Iverson
Appellant in Proper Person
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